Abstract-This paper investigates the effect of eavesdroppers on network connectivity, using a wiretap model and percolation theory. The wiretap model captures the effect of eavesdroppers on link security. A link exists between two nodes only if the secrecy capacity of that link is positive. Network connectivity is defined in a percolation sense, i.e., connectivity exists if an infinite connected component exists in the corresponding secrecy graph. We consider uncertainty in location of eavesdroppers, which is modeled directly at the network level as correlated failures in the secrecy graph. Our approach attempts to bridge the gap between physical layer security under uncertain channel state information and network level connectivity under secrecy constraints. For square and triangular lattice secrecy graphs, we obtain bounds on the percolation threshold, which is the critical value of the probability of occurrence of an eavesdropper, above which network connectivity does not exist. For Poisson secrecy graphs, degree distribution and mean value of upper and lower bounds on node degree are obtained. Further, inner and outer bounds on the achievable region for network connectivity are obtained.Both analytic and simulation results show that uncertainty in location of eavesdroppers has a dramatic effect on network connectivity in a secrecy graph.
duced the wiretap channel and formalized the rate at which messages to the intended receiver can be reliably communicated over a discrete memoryless channel while keeping them confidential from an eavesdropper (wiretapper) that receives the signals from a degraded channel. Csiszár and Körner in [2] provided a general secrecy capacity result for the nondegraded wiretap channel. This framework has been successfully applied to networks with one hop communication, such as broadcast, e.g., [3] , [4] , multiple access, e.g., [5] , and two-hop communication with relays, e.g., [6] , [7] .
Recently, information theoretic techniques have been used to provide end-to-end secrecy in large networks. The concept of secrecy graph was introduced in [8] , which models the communication network and the effect of eavesdroppers on network security. Link connectivity in a secrecy graph is determined using the wiretap model. A link is considered to be connected if the secrecy capacity of the link is positive. The secrecy graph is analyzed for network connectivity using tools from percolation theory [8] , [9] . Thus, network connectivity is defined in percolation sense, i.e., network connectivity exists if an infinite connected component exists in the secrecy graph. Scaling laws for secrecy capacity in large networks have also been investigated in [10] and [11] . In [10] , a random network was considered where the legitimate nodes and eavesdroppers are placed in a square region of area according to independent Poisson point processes (PPPs). It was shown that secrecy requirement does not lead to a loss in throughput, in terms of scaling, if the intensity of eavesdroppers is while the intensity of the legitimate nodes is 1. In [11] , a similar result was shown for mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs) with legitimate nodes and a delay constraint of , if the number of eavesdroppers scales as . In [8] [9] [10] [11] , the channel gains of all the eavesdroppers are assumed to be known precisely. This assumption may not be realistic, especially for a passive eavesdropper, since it may not be possible to ascertain even the presence of such an entity. For wiretap channel models with a few nodes, the uncertainty of the eavesdropper channel can be modeled using a compound channel model [12] , [13] . Noise injection techniques [14] can be used if the channel is unknown in multiple antenna wiretap models. In [15] , it was shown that secrecy is possible even if the eavesdropper's channel is arbitrarily varying. In contrast to these results on small networks, we want to characterize the effect of uncertainty in location of eavesdroppers on network level connectivity, for large networks.
In this paper, we present a secrecy graph approach where the locations of eavesdroppers are uncertain, and this uncertainty results in node and link failures in a secrecy graph. The main challenge is that these failures are correlated, and hence, the tech-niques from percolation theory must be extended to account for these correlations. We assume a communication model where a node is aware of only those legitimate and eavesdropper nodes that are located within a distance from the node. We consider square and triangular lattice secrecy graphs which model regular placement of legitimate nodes. We also consider Poisson secrecy graphs which model random placement of legitimate nodes in according to a PPP. We assume uniform node distribution for analytical tractability [16] , since analytical results are known for only a handful of stochastic network models.
The percolation threshold is the critical value of probability of occurrence of an eavesdropper, above which an infinite connected component does not exist in the secrecy graph, almost surely. Exact results are not known even for a square lattice with independent link and node failures. Hence, this paper provides bounds on percolation threshold for square and triangular lattices, which provide insight into the effect of uncertainty in eavesdropper's location on the percolation properties of lattice secrecy graphs.
For the Poisson secrecy graph, distributions and mean values of upper and lower bounds on the degree of a legitimate node are obtained. Given the intensity of legitimate nodes and the radius of communication , the pair of the intensity of eavesdropper nodes and the radius of uncertainty is achievable if percolation occurs in the corresponding secrecy graph. We obtain inner and outer bounds on the achievable region. In [17] , degree distribution and mean value of bounds on node degree in a Poisson secrecy graph were characterized, in the special case when is infinite. In this paper, we provide a tighter upper bound on the percolation threshold of the triangular lattice, compared to the result in [17] . Both analytical and simulation results demonstrate the dramatic effect of location uncertainty of eavesdroppers on network connectivity in a secrecy graph.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the connectivity problems considered in this paper are presented formally. In Section III, our results on percolation in square and triangular lattices are presented. The Poisson secrecy graph is considered in Section IV. Bounds on the mean node degree, and inner and outer bounds on the achievable region are presented. In Section V, numerical results on percolation probability in lattice secrecy graphs, and bounds on mean node degree and achievable region are presented. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
II. MODEL AND FORMULATION
We denote the function . Let denote a geometric graph in , where is the set of locations of legitimate nodes. is the set of links over which reliable communication is possible. Link reliability is modeled using Gilbert's disk graph model [18] . We assume that the radius of communication, or range of view, is . Two nodes are connected in the geometric graph if the distance between them is at most . A node is unaware of the presence of any eavesdropper outside the circle of radius centered at the node. Each eavesdropper is located within a known finite area, however, the precise location is unknown. Let denote the location of the center of the area which contains eavesdropper . Let denote the corresponding area. The set thus describes the area in which eavesdroppers exist. If the locations of the nodes come from a stochastic point process, we denote the corresponding random variables by and .
We define secrecy graphs (SGs) based on and . A link exists in the secrecy graph if the link exists in the underlying geometric graph and the secrecy capacity of the link is positive. We assume that the wireless medium introduces path loss, with exponent , and that the noise introduced by the receivers is additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN). If a source transmits a signal with power to a receiver at distance , and the eavesdropper is located at distance , the secrecy capacity is given by [19] (1)
The AWGN power is assumed to be unity for both the channels. If the destination is closer than the eavesdropper, i.e., , the secrecy capacity is positive and it is zero otherwise. It should be noted that in this paper, we will utilize this link metric for simplicity. In general, it is difficult to make any claims on the secrecy capacity region of a sizeable network, given the complex interactions that can take place between the network nodes to manage and utilize interference for secrecy [5] , [20] . However, since our goal in this paper is to understand and demonstrate the effect of eavesdroppers on connectivity without the knowledge of their channels, it is fitting to sacrifice the network information theoretic rigor, and instead use this metric for the sake of obtaining a tractable problem. We will employ two secrecy graphs in this paper-directed secrecy graph and basic secrecy graph [8] . In a directed secrecy graph , a link (edge) exists from to if for all . In a basic secrecy graph , a link exists between and if a directed link exists from to and also from to in .
A. Secrecy in Square and Triangular Lattice
We consider square and triangular lattices, shown in Figs. 1 and 3, respectively. A legitimate node is present at each vertex of the lattice, and each node is connected to its nearest neighbors. We assume that the probability that a square (or a triangular) region contains an eavesdropper is . We assume that the links bounding each eavesdropper's location are known. For example, assume that the square in Fig. 1 contains an eavesdropper. In the basic secrecy graph, nodes , , , and will not have any links, and thus, these nodes are considered to have failed. Notice that the node failures are correlated, since all nodes of a given square fail together. Thus, we can model the uncertainty in an eavesdropper's location at the network level, by employing a physical layer model for secrecy. This approach can be extended to include scenarios where each eavesdropper is located within a finite but arbitrary area. For example, assume that an eavesdropper is present within the squares , , or , in Fig. 1 . Then all the nodes marked fail. A similar model is used for the triangular lattice, where nodes on all the vertices of a triangle fail if an eavesdropper is present within that triangle.
B. Secrecy in Poisson Graph
We assume that the locations of legitimate nodes follow a PPP with intensity 1. Each eavesdropper is known to be located within a circle of radius . The radius captures the uncertainty in an eavesdropper's location. The center of the circles follow a PPP with intensity . We denote the directed and basic secrecy graphs by and , respectively.
C. Percolation Threshold
The concept of percolation was introduced by Broadbent and Hammersley [21] , to model the diffusion process in materials. Percolation is said to occur if an infinite connected component exists in the corresponding graph. It was shown that a phase transition exists, i.e., there exists a critical threshold, below which all connected components are finite, almost surely, and above which an infinite connected component exists, almost surely. Similar results exist on connectivity in random graphs [22] ; an area initiated by the work of Erdös and Réyni [23] . In an Erdös-Réyni graph, the probability of existence of a link between any two nodes is independent of the spatial positions of the nodes, and hence, it does not consider network geometry. Therefore, geometric random graphs [24] are used instead, to model wireless networks [25] , [26] , where connectivity is analyzed using tools from continuum percolation [27] .
Let us denote the number of nodes in the connected component containing the origin by . First, we consider lattice secrecy graphs where probability of an eavesdropper occupying a square or triangular region is . The percolation probability and percolation threshold are defined as
Roughly, is the smallest value of for which an infinite component does not exist in the secrecy graph. In other words, for any , the secrecy graph will have an infinite connected component containing the origin, almost surely. However, the origin is part of the infinite component with probability , and not with probability 1 [28] . In Poisson secrecy graphs, we assume that the intensity of the legitimate nodes and the radius of communication are fixed, and define the percolation probability as (4) The percolation threshold pairs are defined as (5) III. SQUARE AND TRIANGULAR LATTICES
In this section, we will present bounds on the percolation threshold of square and triangular lattices, where the eavesdroppers are known to be located within square and triangular areas, respectively. We note that the percolation thresholds are known precisely only for a few lattices. For example, for a triangular lattice, where a node appears at each vertex independently with probability , the critical probability is [29] . However, the corresponding percolation threshold for a square lattice is not known [28] . Notice that in the secrecy graphs considered in this paper, failures are correlated, and hence, the corresponding problems of determining the percolation threshold are expected to be intractable. Therefore, we focus on obtaining upper and lower bounds on the percolation threshold that are as tight as possible. The bounds are obtained by considering a square lattice with different link probabilities for horizontal and vertical links. The following lemma from [30] is useful in obtaining the bounds. [30] ): For a square lattice with link probabilities and for horizontal and vertical links, respectively, the critical probability satisfies (6) Let the distance between the nearest neighbors in a square or triangular lattice be . We will assume that , since percolation can occur in square and triangular lattices only if . We first consider the square lattice, where the probability that a square region bounded by links in the lattice contains an eavesdropper is . It is known which squares contain an eavesdropper; however, the exact locations of the eavesdroppers within the squares are unknown. The following theorem presents bounds on the critical eavesdropper probability, for a square lattice.
Lemma 1. (Sykes and Essam
Theorem 1: For a square lattice where nodes are located on the vertices of the lattice and eavesdroppers are located in square regions of the lattice with probability , the percolation threshold for the basic secrecy graph, denoted by , satisfies (7) Proof: The existence of critical probability follows from [28] . The percolation threshold in the given square lattice is denoted by .
For the upper bound on the percolation threshold, assume that no eavesdroppers are present in the squares for all integers and , and eavesdroppers are present in the remaining squares with probability . Now assume that each square is a node in a new square lattice , and the node fails when there is an eavesdropper in the corresponding square. Further, the nodes in corresponding to squares and are connected if and only if there is no eavesdropper in square . Similarly, the nodes in corresponding to squares and are connected if and only if there is no eavesdropper in square . Thus, in the square lattice , the probability of existence of a node and a link are denoted as and , respectively. Notice that the failures in are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). However, we have a mixed site-bond percolation problem [31] , and the percolation threshold for that problem is not known. To obtain a bond percolation problem with independent bond (link) probabilities, we map a node failure to the failure of the horizontal link connected to that node on the left. Notice that this underestimates the number of link failures, since a node failure would actually result in the failure of all the links connected to it. Thus, we obtain a new square lattice in which node probability is 1 and link probabilities for horizontal and vertical links are and , respectively. Let the critical threshold of for the square lattices and be and , respectively. For a fixed , if percolation does not occur in the square lattice , it cannot occur in the square lattice either. Further, removing eavesdroppers from squares in the square lattice can only increase the critical threshold. Hence, the percolation thresholds of the lattices , , satisfy (8) The percolation threshold of the square lattice can be found using Lemma 1, where link probabilities are and . This gives the upper bound in the statement of the theorem. For the lower bound, consider a tiling in where each tile is a square region consisting of 16 squares. Adjacent rows of tiles are offset by two squares, as shown in Fig. 2(a) . Each tile is mapped to a node in a triangular lattice, which fails when any of the squares in that tile contains an eavesdropper. This results in a triangular lattice with node probability and link probability 1. Note that we are over-counting the number of eavesdroppers, and this results in a lower bound on the percolation threshold. Percolation occurs in the triangular lattice if (9) where is the node (site) percolation threshold for a triangular lattice [29] . Thus, the percolation threshold for the square lattice must be at least . For the square lattice, the probability of a node failure is related to as (10) We contrast this with the scenario where nodes occur on the vertices of a square lattice independently with probability . Let the threshold probability in that case be . In the secrecy graph model, adjacent nodes fail together, and hence, the failures are clustered. Intuitively, a larger number of node failures can be tolerated in the secrecy graph before connectivity is lost, and hence, we expect that . Further, we expect that , since more than one node failures may occur due to the presence of one eavesdropper. Numerical results in Section V will validate this intuition. Now, consider the placement of nodes on the vertices of the triangular lattice and eavesdroppers inside triangular regions of the lattice. Suppose that a triangular region contains an eavesdropper with probability . The critical eavesdropper probability can be bounded as in the following theorem.
Theorem 2: For a triangular lattice where nodes are located on the vertices of the lattice and eavesdroppers are located in triangular regions of the lattice with probability , the percolation threshold for the basic secrecy graph, denoted by , satisfies (11) Proof: We denote the given triangular lattice by . For the upper bound, assume that there are no eavesdroppers in the triangles , , , for all integers and and the eavesdroppers are present in the remaining triangles with probability . The indexing of triangles is shown in Fig. 3 . Now assume that each triangle is a node of a new square lattice which fails when there is an eavesdropper in that triangle. Further, nodes in corresponding to triangles and are connected if and only if there is no eavesdropper in any of the triangles and . Similarly, nodes in corresponding to triangles and are connected if and only if there is no eavesdropper in any of the triangles and . Thus, in the square lattice , the probability of existence of a node and a link is and , respectively. We obtain a bond (link) percolation problem with independent link probabilities by mapping a node failure to the failure of the horizontal link connected to the node on the left. Thus, we obtain a new square lattice with node probability 1 and link probabilities for horizontal and vertical links and , respectively. Let the critical threshold of for square lattices , , and be , , and , respectively. For a fixed , if percolation does not occur in the square lattice , it cannot occur in the square lattice , and in turn it cannot occur in the square lattice . Hence, (12) The percolation threshold can be found using Lemma 1, where link probabilities are and . For the lower bound, consider a tiling in where each tile consists of 24 triangular regions, as shown in Fig. 2(b) . Each tile is mapped to a node in a triangular lattice, which fails when any of the triangular regions in that tile contains an eavesdropper. This results in a triangular model with node probability and link probability 1. Following the arguments in the proof of Theorem 1, it can be shown that the percolation threshold of the triangular lattice must me at least .
IV. POISSON SECRECY GRAPH
In this section, we consider a Poisson model where is a PPP of intensity 1 in (intensity of a point process denotes the density of nodes per unit area). The eavesdroppers are located in known circular regions. The centers of circular regions are located in according to a PPP of intensity , which is independent of . The radius of the circular regions is denoted by . We assume that a legitimate node is aware of only those circular regions containing eavesdroppers whose centers lie within the circle of radius , centered at the node.
For simplicity, we consider the node located at the origin, denoted by . Let denote the number of bidirectional links of node . An analytic computation of is difficult because it requires characterization of the intersection of two regions-a circular region which determines the out-degree of node , and a polygonal region which determines the in-degree of node . The polygonal region is the interior of the region formed by the intersection of bisectors of the line segments which join the origin to the eavesdroppers. Let denote the number of directed links out of node . Assume that the center of a circular region containing an eavesdropper, which is closest to the origin, is located at a distance from it. Then is the number of legitimate nodes in the circle . Clearly,
, and thus, we have an upper bound on the node degree. A lower bound can be obtained by considering the circle , since the origin has a bidirectional link to all the nodes in this region. Let denote the number of legitimate nodes in . Clearly, . In the following, we will present results on the probability mass function (p.m.f.) and mean values of and . The p.m.f. of node degree characterizes the connectivity properties in a Poisson secrecy graph. In Poisson graphs without secrecy constraints, the mean degree is sufficient to characterize the percolation threshold. We will show that a bound on the mean degree can be used to obtain an outer bound on the achievable region.
A. Degree Distributions
We now present the degree distributions of and by computing and , both of which can be expressed in terms of the same set of functions . Let be defined for all as follows:
where (15) is the Gauss error function, and (16) is the upper incomplete gamma function.
In the next theorem, we present the p.m.f. of , the number of out-going links from the node located at the origin. This p.m.f. characterizes the connectivity properties in the directed Poisson secrecy graph. The result is obtained for , since if , nodes will be unaware of eavesdroppers that are located arbitrarily close to them, and no secure communication will be possible in that case.
Theorem 3: In the directed secrecy graph with radius of uncertainty for an eavesdropper's location and radius of communication , the probability mass function of the number of out-going links at the origin is given by (17) Proof: Assume that the center of the circular region containing an eavesdropper, that is closest to the origin, is located at a distance from it. Then, the origin can securely transmit to any node within a circle of radius . Averaging the probability of having legitimate nodes in that circle over results in the statement of the theorem. For details, see Appendix A.
The above result can be specialized to two regimes of interest. In the first regime, the uncertainty in the location of eavesdroppers is small, i.e., . In the second regime, the communication radius is large, i.e., . It is clear that when either or , no secure communication is possible. Corollary 3.1: If the uncertainty in location of the eavesdroppers is small (18) Clearly, isolation probability decreases as the radius of communication increases. If is finite and the radius of communication is infinite (19) Notice that (18) , which is obtained by letting tend to zero, is the same expression obtained in [8] , where it is assumed that the locations of the eavesdroppers are known precisely. In the directed Poisson secrecy graph, the node degree is characterized by obtaining the p.m.f. of . In the following theorem, the p.m.f. of is presented, which is a lower bound on node degree in the basic Poisson secrecy graph.
Theorem 4:
In the basic secrecy graph with radius of uncertainty for eavesdropper's location and radius of communication , the probability mass function of , which is a lower bound on the number of bidirectional links at the origin, is given by (20) Proof: The proof is similar to that of Theorem 3, but nodes within the circle of radius are considered. For details, see Appendix B.
Notice that the probability mass functions of and are given by the same set of functions , albeit with different parameters. This is because the ratio of the areas considered for obtaining and is constant regardless of the distance to the closest eavesdropper. Once again, we specialize the results for and as follows. (21) If is finite and the radius of communication is infinite (22) Thus, we have characterized and by obtaining their p.m.f.s, which show important trends with respect to , , and . The trends are easy to notice in the regimes and . In these regimes, isolation probability increases with and and decreases with , as expected. Isolation probability is an important parameter, since it represents the proportion of nodes in the secrecy graph that cannot communicate securely with any other node. To further our intuition, we next characterize and when two of the parameters , , and take extreme values.
Remark 1: For the directed secrecy graph
Similarly, for the upper bound on isolation probability
Thus, in both cases, none of the nodes have any links, almost surely, in either the directed or basic secrecy graph, if the locations of the eavesdroppers are not known at all. For , we obtain the probability of isolation of a node when locations of all the eavesdroppers are known precisely, which match the results in [8] where was assumed. Note that for small values of , both and increase linearly with . Remark 2: As the eavesdroppers' intensity goes to zero (27) (28) meaning that all the nodes have at least one link, almost surely. As the eavesdroppers' intensity goes to infinity (29) (30) meaning that none of the nodes have any links, almost surely, regardless of the radius of uncertainty for eavesdroppers and even if the communication radius is infinite.
B. Mean Degree and Percolation Threshold
We now present results on the mean degree and percolation threshold for the Poisson secrecy graph. In a Poisson graph with intensity of nodes and communication radius , where no secrecy constraints are imposed, the node degree distribution, and hence, connectivity properties are characterized by the term , which is the mean node degree in the graph. A critical value exists such that if , an infinite connected component exists in the graph with probability 1. If , no infinite connected component exists, with probability 1. In the following theorem, we obtain bounds on the mean degree in the basic Poisson secrecy graph, and then obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for percolation to occur. The necessary condition is obtained in terms of a bound on the mean degree.
Theorem 5: The mean degree of a node in the basic Poisson secrecy graph with secure bidirectional links is bounded as (31) where (32) (33) Proof: The regions corresponding to and were chosen so that . By taking expectation, we obtain (31) . The lower bound is obtained as follows. Let the center of the circular region containing an eavesdropper, that is closest to the origin, be located at a distance from it. The lower bound is computed using the law of total expectation . The upper bound is obtained in a similar manner.
For details, see Appendix C. Notice that the ratio is constant since the ratio of areas considered for obtaining and is fixed. Thus, the bounds are expected to be tight when the mean degree is small. We now specialize the above result for and .
Corollary 5.1: If the uncertainty in the location of eavesdroppers is small (34)
As expected, the mean degree increases as increases. Further, for small and finite, , and hence, the mean degree depends only on . If is finite and the radius of communication is infinite
The mean degree decreases exponentially with the term . We now compute the bounds on the mean degree when two of the parameters , , take extreme values. We expect the bounds to take large values when , are small and is large. 
As expected, if the uncertainty in the eavesdroppers is large, no secure communication is possible. If the communication radius is large, and the uncertainty in the location of eavesdroppers is small, the mean degree has an inverse dependence on . Hence, it is expected that secure communication will be possible if is sufficiently small. As the intensity of eavesdroppers increases, the probability of existence of link decreases, and thus, the mean degree decreases. In the limit of large intensity of eavesdroppers, there is no secure link, almost surely, and thus, the probability that node degree is zero is 1.
We have characterized the lower and upper bounds to the mean degree in a basic Poisson secrecy graph. The above results show that the bounds to mean degree depend crucially on both the radius of uncertainty and the intensity of eavesdropper nodes . We will now characterize the pair of values taken by these two parameters for which an infinite connected component exists in the basic Poisson secrecy graph. We will show that an outer bound on the region is obtained in terms of the upper bound on the mean degree. We begin by defining the achievable region. Thus, we have obtained necessary and sufficient conditions for percolation to occur in the basic Poisson secrecy graph. The outer bound shows that percolation does not occur if the upper bound on the mean degree is smaller than a threshold ( 1.642). The inner bound is obtained by assuming a specific structure on the underlying graph and then computing the probability for such a structure to occur. In Section V, the behavior of the inner and outer bounds is explored through numerical results.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results for lattice and Poisson secrecy graphs. For lattice secrecy graphs, we present simulation results on the percolation threshold. For Poisson secrecy graphs, we present numerical results on the mean degree, and the inner and outer bounds to the achievable region.
A. Lattice Secrecy Graphs
We estimated the percolation probability for square lattice through Monte Carlo simulations. Eavesdroppers were placed in the squares randomly and independently, with the probability of a given square having an eavesdropper being . We estimated the probability that a cluster wraps around the periodic boundary conditions. Cluster wrapping can be defined in several ways. We considered the probability of cluster wrapping in the horizontal and vertical directions, denoted by and , respectively [32] . random lattices were generated for each estimate. Fig. 4 shows the variation of percolation probability with , for . Notice that in Fig. 4 , the percolation probability transitions from a large value (close to 1) to a small value (close to 0). This transition is a typical behavior of percolation probability, and the region of transition becomes narrower as the size of simulated network increases. The percolation threshold can be estimated as the point of intersection of the three curves. Thus, for the square lattice with each eavesdropper located within a square, the percolation threshold is . For , we obtain [using (10) ] for correlated node failures, whereas for independent node failures, the critical threshold is . Although, a larger proportion of node failures can be tolerated in the correlated failure scenario, only 16.3% eavesdroppers can be tolerated in that case.
We now show the effect of the uncertainty in the location of eavesdroppers on the percolation threshold. An eavesdropper may be located anywhere within certain squares. captures the amount of uncertainty in an eavesdropper's location. Fig. 5 shows the variation of percolation probability with for and . As expected, this probability reduces as increases, where the decrease quantifies the effect of uncertainty in location on percolation threshold of secrecy graphs.
B. Poisson Secrecy Graphs: Mean Degree
We now present numerical results for the Poisson secrecy graph. Fig. 6 shows the variation of the upper and lower bounds on the mean degree of the node located at the origin in the basic secrecy graph with , for . was chosen as 0.1 for which percolation occurs at [8] . For a fixed value of , the upper and lower bounds both decrease to zero as increases. As expected, the bounds on the mean degree increase as the radius of communication increases. The figure shows that the mean degree is severely limited if is small. For the range of values of considered here, the bounds on the mean degree are the same for and ; i.e., for , the mean degree is limited by the secrecy constraint. Fig. 7 shows the variation of the upper and lower bounds on the mean degree with , for , and . As expected, the bounds on the mean degree increase with . The figure shows that the bounds on the mean degree converge to the asymptotic value at . For , the mean degree is zero for . When , the mean degree increases as increases. The figure shows a dramatic reduction in the mean degree as increases. Further, for small values of , the mean degree increases quickly with and then saturates. Fig. 8 shows the variation of the upper and lower bounds on the mean degree with , for , and . As expected, for fixed values of and , the bounds on the mean degree decrease with an increase in . The figure shows that for the range of values of considered here, the mean degree decreases sharply as increases from 0 to 0.5, and the decrease is moderate when .
C. Poisson Secrecy Graphs: Inner and Outer Bounds on Achievable Region
The inner and outer bounds on the achievable region are shown in Fig. 9 . The result in Fig. 9 indicates that perfect secrecy can be attained to the left of the lower bound while it cannot be attained to the right of the upper bound. Inner and outer bounds are presented for . The outer bound reduces dramatically as is reduced from 10 to 2, showing the need for a large communication radius . Notice that for and small ,the inner andouter bounds follow a similartrend,although there is a significant gap between the two. The large gap suggests that at least one of the bounds is not tight. The inner bound shows that percolation will occur for large values of as long as is sufficiently small. As becomes small, the lower bound remains to the left of . This is because of the specific structure assumed for deriving the inner bound.
VI. CONCLUSION
We considered a secrecy graph approach to investigate the effect of eavesdroppers with uncertain locations on network connectivity, which was defined in the percolation sense. The communication network and the impact of eavesdroppers on network connectivity were modeled via a secrecy graph. The uncertainty in the location of the eavesdroppers was modeled directly at the network level as correlated failures in the secrecy graph. Bounds on percolation thresholds of square and triangular lattice secrecy graphs were presented. For the Poisson secrecy graph, the degree distribution and mean value of upper and lower bounds on the mean node degree were presented. Inner and outer bounds on the achievable region of pairs of the intensity of eavesdropper nodes and the radius of uncertainty for eavesdropper locations were obtained. Both analytic and numerical results showed that uncertainty in the location of the eavesdroppers effects connectivity in a secrecy graph dramatically. Future directions include investigating information theoretic secrecy-based methods to mitigate the effect of uncertainty in location (CSI) of eavesdroppers, using the secrecy graph approach developed in this paper. THEOREM 5 Assume that the center of a circular region containing an eavesdropper, which is closest to the origin, is located at a distance from it. Using the law of total expectation, we obtain (52) (53) where holds because for a fixed , the mean number of legitimate nodes in the circle are (the intensity of the legitimate nodes is assumed to be 1). The distribution of is . Thus,
For the upper bound, we consider all the nodes in the circle . Therefore,
APPENDIX D PROOF OF THEOREM 6 First consider the outer bound. We obtain a necessary condition for percolation in the directed Poisson secrecy graph. If percolation does not occur in this graph, it cannot occur in the basic Poisson secrecy graph either, and hence, an outer bound on the achievable region is obtained. The proof for the outer bound closely follows the analysis in [33] . Let denote the component containing the origin. Consider a sequence of pair of sets . At step , is the set of points that belong to , such that all neighbors of points in also belong to . is the set of points which belong to but whose neighbors have not been explored. We start with the origin, and initialize and . The process terminates at step if , otherwise a point is chosen and we set (58) 
For the lower bound, consider a tiling in using square tiles where the edge length of each tile is . A frame consists of tiles. We map each frame to a node in a square lattice. Consider tiles A and B marked in Fig. 10 . The maximum distance between a node in tile A and a node in tile B is s. Therefore, any node in tile A can communicate securely with any node in tile B if there is no eavesdropper within tiles on each side, with . We choose to define the frames. Assume that the center of a circular region containing an eavesdropper is present at the boundary of a frame. A node in the center tile of the frame can communicate securely with a node in a neighboring tile only if (66) Now, consider the square lattice obtained by mapping each frame to a node in the lattice. A node exists in the lattice if the corresponding frame has no eavesdropper and a legitimate node is present in each of the shaded tiles in Fig. 10 . Thus, the site probability for the square lattice is given by (67) We maximize by choosing the optimal value of (68) and denote the optimal value of by . Percolation occurs in the square lattice, and hence, in the Poisson secrecy graph, if , where is an upper bound on the percolation threshold for the square lattice [33] . Thus, percolation occurs in the Poisson secrecy graph if (69)
